Reaching Out From Behind Bars:  The Constitutionality of laws Barring Prisoners From the Internet by Holtz, Titia A.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 67 | Issue 3 Article 5
1-1-2002
Reaching Out From Behind Bars: The
Constitutionality of laws Barring Prisoners From
the Internet
Titia A. Holtz
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Titia A. Holtz, Reaching Out From Behind Bars: The Constitutionality of laws Barring Prisoners From the Internet, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 855
(2002).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol67/iss3/5
NOTE
REACHING OUT FROM BEHIND BARS:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWS BARRING
PRISONERS FROM THE INTERNET*
This is the man who murdered my father, telling strangers that he's
a nice guy! He was a meth addict who had been on drugs for a week
straight before he killed my dad. Why should he and other inmates
get to post their pictures and messages on the Web at all, telling
people to write to them because they are lonely?
1
[A] computer is a tool which allows a prisoner freedom to function
and develop irrespective of physical restrictions. To present [oneself]
as a human being and a citizen in society, not reduced to an animal
in a cage with a number.2
Access to the Internet is not a necessary tool for the correctional
3process.
The aim of our prisons should be to release people who are able to
reintegrate themselves into society.
4
02002 Titia A. Holtz. All Rights Reserved.
'Alissa Quart, This Man Murdered My Father, ON MAG., Apr. 2001, at
http'//www.onmagazine.comfon-mag/magazinelarticle/0,9985,103342-1,00.html (last
visited Oct. 28, 2001).
2 [PRISONACTJ Update Prisoner Computer Access, Oct. 6, 1999, at
http'J/www.prisonactivist.org/pipernail/prisonact-list/1999-October/003338.html (last
visited Oct. 28, 2001).
3 Steve Silberman, Twice Removed: Locked Up and Barred from Net, Dec. 3,
1997, at http/www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,8854,00.html (last visited Oct. 28,
2001).
4Id.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1995, when U.S. District Court Judge Sam Sparks
sentenced Chris Lamprecht to seventy months in the Federal
Correctional Institution in Bastrop, Texas for money
laundering, he added a special requirement to the computer
hacker's punishment-Lamprecht was forbidden any access to
the Internet until 2003. At the time, Swing magazine dubbed
Lamprecht "the first person to be officially exiled from
cyberspace."6 If Lamprecht was, in fact, the first person ever
explicitly denied access to the Internet, he was certainly not
the last. Starting with an internal memo circulated within the
Federal Bureau of Prisons in 1996 keeping inmates from the
Internet,7 and continuing through to the passage of federal and
state laws denying prisoners either direct or indirect access to
the Web, Internet, or both,8 inmates' free speech rights, and
often times those of outsiders, have been impeded.
Speech, regardless of the popularity of the content of the
message, is one of the most valued rights in our nation.9 The
guarantees of free speech under the First Amendment ensure
that we can have an open dialogue regarding our thoughts and
feelings and that we can hold our government responsible."
Thus, the Supreme Court has long maintained that in order to
"abridge First Amendment freedoms of people in the free
world, the government must have a 'compelling state interest.'
"11 The same standards, however, are not applied in the prison
environment.
12
5 Id.
6Id.
7Id.
'See infra Part IV.
'"The 'Constitution's most majestic guarantee' is the free speech clause of the
First Amendment." MICHAEL MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 213 (2d ed. 1993) (citing
LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §12-1, at 785 (2d ed. 1988)).
to Id.
" Id. at 214 (citing as examples Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educs.'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155
(1973) ("Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that
regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,'
and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake.") (citations omitted).
12 See MUSHLIN, supra note 9, at 213.
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Incarceration is the American way of telling members of
society that if they do not follow the laws of the land,
punishment is the automatic response. 3 Where incarceration is
imposed as the appropriate punishment, it follows that those
convicted of a crime lose certain rights until they have served
the time to compensate for their actions. The Supreme Court
has recognized, however, that prisoners do not lose all of their
constitutional freedoms once they are placed behind bars.14 The
difficulty lies in striking a balance between "the constitutional
rights at issue and the legitimate institutional requirements
and goals [of the penal system]."
Likewise, the purposes of punishment are oft-
debated' 6 -whether it be retribution, rehabilitation, or
deterrence. But it is undeniable that since approximately
ninety percent of all inmates will one day be released, 7
allowing prisoners to communicate with the outside world has
important consequences:
Without such contact with society outside the prison walls,
rehabilitation would be adversely affected, prison morale weakened,
perhaps inviting riots and other forms of internal disorder, and the
inmates' ability to readjust to the world outside the institution upon
release would be markedly impaired.1
8
Free speech in the prison context is also important since
it is the only first-hand account we have as to how the
For an elaboration on the purposes of incarceration, see James L. Esposito,
Comment, Virtual Freedom-Physical Confinement: An Analysis of Prisoner Use of the
Internet, 26 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINIiEMENT 39, 59-66 (2000).
14 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). Though the Court refused to take
an aggressive approach in this case, it still recognized that "prison walls do not form a
barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution." Id.I BARBARA B. KNIGHT & STEPHEN T. EARLY, JR., PRISONERS' RIGHTS IN
AMiERICA 215 (1986).
,6 For a discussion of the notions of criminal punishment and how they fit
within the context of prisoners' communication rights, see supra note 13.
7 Michael James, LEARNING BEHIND BARS: State program Gives Inmates
a Chance to Earn College Degrees via Well-Guarded Net Connections, BALT. SUN, Feb.
12, 2001, at IC, available at 2001 WL 6150656.
18 KNIGHT & EARLY, supra note 15, at 216. A Rhode Island district judge wrote
that "Metter writing keeps the inmate in contact with the outside world, helps to hold
in check some of the morbidity and hopelessness produced by prison life and isolation,
stimulates his more natural and human impulses, and otherwise may make
contributions to better mental attitudes and reformation." Palmigiano v. Travisono,
317 F. Supp. 776, 786 (D.R.I. 1970). See also LEONARD ORLAND, JUSTICE, PUNISHIENT,
TREATMENT 389 (1973).
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penal system is run. 9 Communication also plays a vital role in
an inmate's access to the courts and his relations with
counsel."
Although prisoners' mail and telephone rights have
already been established by case law, the advent of the
Internet poses new problems for both the courts and penal
systems. New regulations and laws, both federal and state,
have raised interesting questions regarding whether these
pieces of legislation are constitutional and whether prisoners'
existing communication rights need to be altered in light of the
Internet. The dilemma lies in the fact that these new pieces of
legislation wish to regulate inmates' rights on the Internet, a
medium that prisoners are able to reach through already
established mail and phone rights. Given this, regulation of
access to the Internet will probably, if not inevitably, affect
prisoners' communication rights in a general manner as well as
specifically as to the type of medium chosen.
Part I of this Note will discuss the current status of
inmates on the Internet. Part II will briefly describe the
evolution of prisoners' mail rights and the current
constitutional standards of review. Part III will investigate
federal initiatives to curtail inmate use of the Internet. Other
federal Internet legislation and litigation will be examined in
an effort to predict how the courts will deal with this issue vis
A vis inmates. Part IV will explore recent state legislation,
particularly in Arizona and Ohio, in order to highlight
differences and to hypothesize whether these laws will pass
constitutional muster. Part V will analyze a recent appellate
court decision in California-the first case to confront the
issues associated with prisoners' communication rights with
respect to the Internet.
This Note will conclude that efforts by Congress and the
legislatures of Arizona and Ohio to curtail inmate use of the
Internet will confront daunting constitutional challenges. The
Supreme Court's current standards of review to determine
prisoners' communication rights will need to be reevaluated if
these new laws are to be upheld. The federal initiative,
however, is far less likely to fail a test of constitutionality than
the laws passed at the state level. Given that only one case has
19 MUSHLIN, supra note 9, at 214.
20 See KNIGHT & EARLY, supra note 15, at 216.
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come before a court of this nation involving these issues, the
recent California decision upholding a prison regulation, which
prohibits sending information downloaded from the Internet to
an inmate, is an interesting development.2 Should other courts
follow suit when confronted with similar problems, it begs the
question of whether prison officials should be granted such a
high level of latitude in the face of both inmates' and outsiders'
constitutional rights. If the Supreme Court does, in fact,
change its standards of review to uphold statutes such as the
one promulgated in Arizona, such a decision could allow for the
regulation of speech in general.
I. PRISONERS ON THE INTERNET
Though every state bans inmates from direct access to
the Internet to some extent, keeping prisoners "one step behind
the digital revolution . . . still, their Web presence is
substantial."' Typing "inmates" or "prisoners" into any large
search engine yields a multitude of sites.' Despite the lack of
direct access to the Web, prisoners are able to reach the
Internet through the use of the regular postal service and the
help of third parties. Inmates write letters including the
content of their personal ad or of their Web site, complete with
desired graphics, and send them via regular mail to site
designers or family members, who in turn manifest the
prisoner's wishes on the Internet. Should the inmate receive
email to his site, the message is simply printed and sent to the
inmate, who answers by mail, sending the letter to the creator
of the Web site. Whoever runs the Web page from the outside
will then post the response on the Internet.
Relatives of victims have expressed outrage at the
existence of such sites. Marc Klaas, father of twelve-year-old
Polly Klaas killed in 1993, states that "these guys . . . have
21 In re Aaron Collins, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
2Michelle Locke, Prison Inmates Find Their Way Onto Web Despite
Restrictions, MORNING NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Washington), Oct. 4, 2000, at D1,
available at 2000 WL 5338633 [hereinafter Locke I].
"Search engines such as http'J/www.yahoo.com and httpJ/www.excite.com
are usually the most effective. Some of the Web pages that come up when you type in
"prisoners" or "inmates" include http://www.prisonpenpals.org, http'J/www.meet-an-
inmate.com, and httpJ/www.prisonactivist.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2001).
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been taken out of society because we're trying to deny them
access and influence."24 Victim sympathizers assert that since
not every home, school, or business in the United States has
access to the Internet,25 the fight to give such a luxury to
prisoners seems ridiculous. In contrast, inmates and their
advocates argue that contact with the outside world and access
to educational resources and practical technical skills are
extremely important given that most prisoners will reenter
society at some point in the future.
In the state of Washington, inmate Paul Wright has
edited Prison Legal News for the past ten years.26 This
publication offers a medium for interested outsiders to find out
about prison-related news from the inside.27 In April 1998, a
Web site was established to extend the newsletter's reader
base, but the publication is still circulated predominantly
through regular mail and Wright has never seen the Web
page.28 Wright has analogized prisoner access to the Internet to
"sitting beside the information superhighway watching the
traffic go by."29 He likens the fight for inmate Internet access to
the fight waged years ago regarding the issue of prisoner
telephone use.3" Wright contends that such access is important:
"Having contact with the outside world.., gives us a human
face as opposed to the caricature that dominates the media
14 Locke I, supra note 22. Many prisoner pleas for companionship and help are
met with little sympathy. Martin Draughon, a man currently on Texas' death row for
killing a bystander during a robbery, has a Web site maintained with the help of a
Danish man opposed to the death penalty. A visitor to the site once wrote: "'The whole
world is out here. Today I ate at MacDonald's, I saw pretty women, even got laid last
night. But you are never going to see a MacDonald's again, and will only get laid in
your imagination. All of the suffering is because of your ACTIONS.' " Jennifer
Gonnerman, Prisoner Uses Web Site to Communicate With the Outside World, May 17,
2000, at http//www.cnn.com/2000/TECHI computingfO5/17/prison.web.idg (last visited
Oct. 28, 2001) (emphasis in original).
25 For example, Hispanics and African-Americans are only forty percent as
likely as whites to have Internet access in the home. See Jeremy Pelofsky, FCC Head:
Net Access a "Civil Rights" Issue, REUTERS, May 13, 2000, at
http:/www.zdnet.con/zdnn/stories/news0,4586,2569305,00.html (last visited Jan. 15,
2001). In addition, "one survey showed that fewer than 5 percent of towns of 10,000
people or less have cable modem services while more than 65 percent of all cities with
populations over 250,000 have such a service." Id.
26 Locke I, supra note 22.
27 Id.
28 Id.
2 Id.
30 Id.
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image."3 ' Like other states, Washington prohibits direct access
to the Internet, forcing inmates to look to third parties to post
their material online. 2
In Cameron, Missouri, a widowed mother named Rene
Mulkey operates a Web site, www.cyberspace-inmates.com,3"
that allows prisoners, for a monthly fee of $10, to place
personal ads and seek pen pals on the Internet. 4 Inmates pen
alluring ads, leaving out important negative details,35 and then
mail the information to Ms. Mulkey to post on the net." The
loneliness and isolation associated with incarceration inspire
31 Locke I, supra note 22.
32 Id.
3 There are numerous other Web sites that provide similar services to those
found on cyberspace-inmates.com. For example, on www.jailbabes.com, twenty-three-
year-old Senia, who is expected to be released from prison on July 30, 2004, is looking
for "one good man to spoil and pamper one fiercely independent, daring, mischievous,
sexy, wild, caged kitty who is in need of love and attention from a generous, educated,
quick-witted gentleman. He must know how to make this kitty purr by stroking her
not just sexually but mentally, physically and financially." Jail Babes, at
http://www.jailbabes.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2001). On www.outlawsonline.com,
Kayle Bates, currently on death row, writes of how he wants a "true and caring
woman." Most Wanted Outlaws Online, at http://www.outlawsonline.com (last visited
Jan. 13, 2001). He even includes a poem to describe the kind of relationship he and
that special lady could have:
A Friend ... A confidante, sharing deep dark secrets, we wouldn't tell
but only to each other ... Baring the soul to relieve us from anxieties
and guilt, building a strong trust . . . reaching out across time and
space ... drawing the other into our mind ... using a 'special power'
that would make others cower. Never letting another soul enter that
special space in our heart that we hold for each other ... Leaning on
each other, coming through when things are down . . . sharing the
'Good Times' too and being a true friend, Is loyalty. [sic] Without the
signing of a contract.
Id. See also http://www.prisonpennpals.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2001); supra note 23
and accompanying text.
Jeanette White, Pen Pals: Prisoners Use the Internet to Trawl for Female
Friends-and Perhaps Their Money, SPOKESNMN REV. (Spokane, Washington), Sept.
10, 2000, at F1, available at 2000 WL 22735000. Similar services have opted instead to
charge outsiders for the ability to attain the inmate's mailing address. Id.
3"In San Quentin, death row inmate Morris Solomon writes that he is
'romantic, and loves to meet people,' " but fails to add that he has murdered six
women. Locke I, supra note 21, at D1. Susan Fisher of a Sacramento-based Doris Tate
Crime Victims Bureau: "'I don't necessarily think this is a First Amendment'issue. I
think that this is a truth-in-advertising issue.' " Id. Some sites such as
www.penpals.com now mandate that inmates using their services disclose the nature
of the crime of which they were convicted. Ian Ith, Killers Fishing Online for Pen Pals:
"I Miss Talking With Women... I Miss Smelling Perfume," SEATTLE TIMES, May 11,
2001, at B1, available at 2001 WL 3508717.3 White, supra note 34, at Fl.
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these prisoners to seek companionship and romance. Victims'
rights advocates respond to these ads with horror. 7 In addition,
there is concern that many outsiders are made vulnerable to
the coaxing of the inmates to provide money, sex, or cigarettes
in addition to the occasional friendly letter."
Some prisons have implemented sanctions for situations
in which prisoners deceive outsiders to send money, but no
such penalties are available for lying about one's personal or
physical characteristics. 9 Upon discovering that inmates were
using Web sites to get men to send them money, one private
women's facility in Oklahoma starting issuing "misconducts,"
which can result in a prisoner doing more time.4" These
sanctions are in accordance with a policy adopted by the
Oklahoma Department of Corrections, which prohibits both
direct and indirect access to the Internet for inmates.41 Even
with policies as those adopted in Oklahoma, enforcement is
difficult and inmates still find their way onto the Internet.
37 Susan Fisher of a Sacramento-based Doris Tate Crime Victims Bureau:
"'For them to have access to the general public is outrageous.'" Locke I, supra note 22,
at D1.
38 Id. Even before the Internet, inmates were successful at coercing pen pals
into sending them money, so the concern lies in the fact that with ads being posted on
the net, the number of potential victims rises exponentially. Id. For example, Frankie
Cruz, an inmate in Canon City, Colorado, uses the Internet not only to talk freely
about prison life, but also to make money: "'In here on the inside it's a whole new ball
game, stuff goes on in here you would not believe, stuff you's [sic] never hear about out
therein [siclrespectful society . . . If you would like to be schooled on one of the
following issues or all three issues, 'Jailhouse Politics,' 'Drugs in Prison,' or 'Gang
Rapes,' I'll run it down to you from experience, in details.'" Rhonda Cook, Prisoners of
Love are Waiting For You: Inmates Online Seek Cybermates, ATLANTA J. CONST., May
11, 1997, at G04, available at http://www.ou.edu/oupd/inmate.htm (last visited Oct. 28,
2001). Cruz asks interested parties for $40 for an explanation of one issue, or $100 for
all three issues. Id. Prison administrators are disheartened by the fact that "the
Internet has allowed prisoners to have soapboxes and to prey on the innocent and
softhearted." Dirk Johnson, Prison Inmates' Use of Web Kindles Debate on Free Speech,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 11, 2000, at 8, available at 2000 WL 3707353.
39 White, supra note 34 (explaining that at the Walla Walla State
Penitentiary such infractions include more cell time).
40 Barbara Hoberock, Prison Cracks Down on Web Scams, TULSA WORLD, May
29, 2001, at 4, available at 2001 WL 6929884.
41 Id. While the policy enforced in the private prison denies inmates
even indirect access to the Internet for the purposes of"purchasing items through the
Internet, [or] subscribing to any services offered including any personal advertising or
electronic mail," the warden acknowledges that "the correspondence is not the issue•...
. You can become a pen pal through an ad in the back of magazines. The issue is the
misrepresentation and the receiving of huge sums of money from these guys who don't
have that kind of money and under false pretenses." Id.
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Despite the distaste and anger that many victims have
expressed,' 2 regulation of such inmate writings proves to be
difficult given the differing standards of review used by the
Supreme Court regarding prisoners' communication rights.43
The Internet has also become a medium for publishing
written works and other artistic creations." Very often,
inmates have used the Internet not only to look for pen pals 5
and counsel,46 but also as a way to convey the inner workings of
the American prison system or to tell their stories in order to
garner support from the outside. Others write of their
personal growth48 while incarcerated or share their creative
writing or art work.49
Presumably, regulation of these types of writings would
be subject to the test50 associated with outgoing correspondence
and expression intended for a civilian audience. It follows that,
42 Jennifer Johnson Lopez [now Jennifer Martinez] is the daughter of the
deceased musician Roy Johnson, the victim of Arizona inmate Beau Greene's brutal
beating. When she discovered that the prisoner had a Web site asking for pen pals, Ms.
Lopez was "disgusted .... He said he missed companionship. I thought, 'Serves you
right.' " Johnson, supra note 38, at 8. Victims are not the only ones, however, who are
disturbed by the presence of inmates on the net. True-crime novelist, Ann Rule, was
appalled when she discovered an ad on the Internet describing a serial killer who had
been the subject of one of her works. Jerry Brudos, a resident of the Oregon State
Penitentiary, advertised for a "special lady." Ms. Rule tried to take action by calling
both the prosecutor's office and prison officials, but was informed that there was
nothing she could do. White, supra note 34.
43 See infra Part II.
'ASee, e.g., http:J/dunelm.freeyellow.com/books.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2001).45 See Esposito, supra note 13, at 46-47.46 See id. at 44-46.
47 Inmates are not prohibited from drafting books and manuscripts as long as
such creative endeavors do not conffict with prison work duties. With respect to the
federal prison system, see 28 C.F.R § 551.81.
In San Quentin, Jarvis Masters, incarcerated for armed robbery and then
sentenced to death for the murder of a guard, writes about meditation and being a
Buddhist. Michelle Locke, Inmates Use Internet as Lifeline Beyond the Walls, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2000, at B1, available at 2000 WL 25907355 [hereinafter Locke II].4 9 Also in San Quentin, thanks to a Canadian Web page sponsored by an anti-
death penalty group, Richard Allen Davis, a death row inmate, exhibits photographs of
his artwork. Id.
so Discussed infra Part II. The Martinez test is applied in situations where
mail leaves the prison's gates and is meant for a civilian audience. The test requires
that in these situations, courts must apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to see if
the regulation is closely related to the penological interest claimed. Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) [hereinafter Martinez]. This test is utilized because
these situations implicate the First Amendment rights of outsiders, and because the
threat of outgoing mail to prison security is far more tenuous than the threat posed by
mail that enters the institution. See id. at 416.
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according to the constitutional standard applied by the courts
in these situations, there is a direct conflict between the
current standards of review regarding inmate mail and the
movement to suppress prisoner expression on the Internet.
Since inmates reach the Web via written correspondence,
efforts to curtail prisoner expression that involve writing and
contact with outsiders are antagonistic to the Supreme Court's
distinction between incoming and outgoing mail. The
standards of review for prisoners' communication rights are
already established."1 If the Court does in fact reconsider and
alter the standard of review for outgoing mail so that these
new statutes can be upheld, the tenets of the First Amendment
will be compromised in a manner that makes the future for
freedom of expression uncertain, not only for prisoners, but
also for those not incarcerated.
Interestingly, while some states are passing legislation
to keep inmates offline, other states are working hard to make
access to the Internet a reality for certain qualified prisoners.
Maryland is at the forefront of this movement. At Patuxent
Institution, a maximum-security prison, twenty-three offenders
are preparing to earn a college degree via the Internet while
incarcerated.52 The focus is on rehabilitation and treatment.
Students will "submit ... assignments by computer, e-mail...
[to] professors and complete . . .homework with information
found on the World Wide Web."53 Technicians have been
brought into the facility to ensure that internal security is not
breached in any manner. Students enrolled in the program will
only be introduced to a closed universe with a controlled
connection.54 The connection allows for information to be sent
and received long after the students have left the terminals for
the day.55 When they return, the data they require will be on
their computer, but no connection to the outside world can be
established at that point in time."
r" See infra Part II.
52 James, supra note 17.
5
Id.
5 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
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States such as California, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana,
North Carolina, Colorado, and Idaho have expressed interest in
the results of the pilot program in Maryland.57 It is possible
that educational programs such as this one may spread
throughout the country, competing with the interest in denying
prisoners any access to the Internet. Proponents of the
Internet-based educational program argue that it is relatively
inexpensive compared with other training alternatives.58 In
addition, prison officials are beginning to recognize that
"computer and technical skills are important for inmates, most
of whom will eventually earn parole or finish their sentences..
. . [Clonvicts locked up for years without contact with the
digital world emerge from prison with a severe technical
handicap." 9 In fact, in the near future, "some prison officials
and tech company executives expect convicts will be surfing the
Web to start job searches before their releases, exchanging e-
mail with teachers of online courses, even sharing virtual
classroom space with non-incarcerated students."0
Some institution officials are beginning to realize the
role that the Internet has come to play in society and are afraid
they might be irresponsible if they allow inmates back into the
world without the necessary skills. Conversely, other prison
officials and legislators are fearful of the message sent to
society every time a member of the public comes across an
inmate's Web page on the Internet. This latter group has
lobbied and passed legislation denying prisoners any Internet
access to prisoners whether direct or indirect.6 The language
chosen to explain the content of each of these pieces of
legislation may be the determinative factor in deciding
"James, supra note 17. Ohio's interest in the program is somewhat
surprising considering the law its legislature has passed regarding inmate Internet
access; however, the law does allow for access for certain educational ventures. See
infra Part IV. California's interest in the Maryland project is far more interesting
given a recent appellate court decision prohibiting any material printed off of, or
originating on, the Internet from entering the institution. Perhaps prison officials
would consider an education exception. See infra Part V.
James, supra note 17.
9 Id.
Damien Cave, Jailhouse Net: Inmates With E-Mail? It Could Happen
at Some State Prisons Experimenting With Technology Behind Bars, July 13, 2000, at
http://www.salon.con/tech/feature/2000/07/13/prison/print.html (last visited Oct. 28,
2001). 61See infra Parts III and IV.
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whether these laws will be deemed constitutional. An
understanding of the standards adopted by the Supreme Court
over the years in the arena of prisoners' communication rights
is imperative in order to attempt to predict the life span of
these laws.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PRISONERS' COMMUNICATION
RIGHTS62
The treatment of prisoners' free speech rights has
undergone some important changes over time, the results of
which may now need to be reconsidered in light of the
pervasiveness of the Internet, its far-reaching capabilities, and
the effect the Web will have on the future of freedom of
expression rights in general. Initially, courts adopted a very
"hands off' approach, deferring to the expertise of corrections
and penal personnel with respect to prisoner communication.6
The judiciary contended that these bodies were best able to
determine their own needs with regard to prison
administration and internal security.6
Prison officials have explained that limitations on
inmates' freedom of speech are necessary in order to be able to
maintain peaceful and secure conditions within the
institution. 5 In addition, officials warn that mail is an easy
way for prisoners to receive contraband, plan escapes or other
disruptive behavior, and gain exposure to ideas or information
that prison administrators would prefer to keep from inmates."6
Finally, operators of correctional facilities have made
administrative arguments that point to procedural problems
when the influx of incoming and outgoing mail reaches
proportions that are deemed too large. Some of these
For a helpful elaboration and explanation of prisoners' mail rights through
case law and constitutional standards of review, see Jennifer A. Manetta, Note, The
Proper Approach to Prison Mail Regulations: Standards of Review, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 209 (1998).
See e.g., McClosky v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1964) ("Control
of the mail to and from inmates is an essential adjunct of prison administration"). See
also Manetta, supra note 62, at 214.
KNIGHT & EARLY, supra note 15, at 215.
MUSHLIN, supra note 9, at 215.
Id. See also, KNIGHT & EARLY, supra note 15, at 216.
67 Id.
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propositions, however, become less convincing when it is
considered that telephone calls and prison visits, arguably an
easier manner in which to plot escapes and other such
problematic scenarios, are not always monitored."
Nonetheless, the exchange of written correspondence is far
more frequent than these communication alternatives, making
regulation of the mail an important issue. However, thoughinmate correspondence does pose some admitted dangers to the
internal security of the. prison environment, such threats
should not be overstated so as to freeze inmates' First
Amendment rights entirely. Such an exaggerated conclusion
could begin a movement to regulate freedom of expression
rights in general.
Despite the previous trend to leave rules regarding
prisoner correspondence to the expertise of prison officials,
courts have recently become more active in determining
inmates' communication rights. 9 Three main cases illustrate
this progression: Procunier v. Martinez," Turner v. Safley," and
Thornburgh v. Abbott."
A. Procunier v. Martinez
In 1974, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
issue a broad ruling on prisoners' communication rights, but it
opted to decide this case, challenging mail censorship rules in
California state prisons, on narrower grounds. The rules in
question allowed prison officials to open and read all personal
incoming and outgoing mail. 3 Mail that was considered to
"unduly complain" or "magnify grievances," along with any
correspondence that expressed "inflammatory political, racial,
(or) religious" views or was "lewd, obscene or defamatory,"
could be censored. 4 Here, the First Amendment rights of
Title III, Omnibus Crime Control Act protects prisoners from having their
telephone conversations overheard by a prison official using an extension phone,
thereby protecting an inmate's right to privacy. KNIGHT & EARLY, supra note 15, at
294 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520).
69 KNIGHT & EARLY, supra note 15, at 215.
70 416 U.S. 396 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbot, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
71 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
72 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
73 MUSHLIN, supra note 9, at 216.
74 Martinez, 416 U.S. at 399-400.
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prisoners were directly implicated, but the Court shied away
from that issue, focusing instead on the freedom of speech
ramifications for those in the free world attempting to
correspond with inmates.
The Court, forced to resolve the conflict between the
rights of those not incarcerated to communicate with those
behind bars, and the interests of those trying to control the
prison environment, decided to compromise. First Amendment
rights are generally subject to a heightened level of scrutiny,75
whereas prisoners' communication rights traditionally have
been subjected to the lowest level of scrutiny-a simple
showing that the rule bears a rational relation to a penological
interest.76 The Supreme Court ordered that in these situations,
where the free speech rights of outsiders are involved, courts
should implement a mid-level standard of review.77 A two-part
test was created: "First, the regulation or practice in question
must further an important or substantial governmental
interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Second, the
limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater
than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular
governmental interest involved."78
Using this test, the Court held that the California
prison rules were unconstitutional since there was no proven
connection between inmate-outsider correspondence and
threats to prison security.79 The Court also reasoned that the
rules were overinclusive because they included material that
did not jeopardize institutional interests." The significance of
this decision lies in the fact that the Court took some power
away from prison officials to determine inmates'
communication rights. Given the Martinez decision, "inmates
(could) now claim a right to send and to receive mail, not
simply a privilege granted them by prison officials at their
discretion."8 Martinez did not represent, however, a true
victory for inmates and their advocates. Rather than decide
prisoners' free speech rights, the Court basically reiterated its
75 See KNIGHT & EARLY, supra note 15, at 215.
7G Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 416.8"Id.
"1 KNIGHT & EARLY, supra note 15, at 216.
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position on the rights of outsiders. By doing this, the Court
gave little guidance as to how to protect inmates' First
Amendment guarantees in other situations.
In Bell v. Wolfish, 2 the Supreme Court was once again
confronted with the issue of prisoners' freedom of expression
rights. Pretrial detainees challenged numerous regulations in a
federally operated short-term custodial facility in New York
City,' including the facility regulation regarding receipt of
reading material, as violative of the detainees' First
Amendment rights.' The "publisher-only" rule allowed
hardcover books into the facility only if they had been sent
directly from the publisher, a book club, or a bookstore.'
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held that such a
regulation did not violate the First Amendment.86 The fact that
contraband could be easily transported inside the institution
via a hardcover book was a sufficient showing that there was a
rational state interest.
Even though the rights of outsiders were involved to the
extent that no one besides those designated by the rule could
send a detainee hard bound reading material, the Court failed
to even mention the Martinez decision. Since there were
alternative means to get tbe books,88 and since the threat posed
to the facility was legitimate, 9 the Court saw no problem with
upholding the regulation. Though the decision in Bell is
understandable, since books are an easy way to smuggle escape
plans and contraband, it exhibits the importance of the fact
that the Supreme Court did not take the opportunity to rule on
the larger issues in Martinez.90 The Court in Martinez failed to
address prisoners' communication rights, and by doing so, left
inmates with almost no avenues of relief when prison officials
441 U.S. 520 (1979).
" Id. at 523.
8 See id. at 527.
"Id. at 550.
8 Id.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 551.
as Id.
89 Id.
90 After Martinez, but prior to Bell, the Supreme Court again backed away
from deciding prisoners' communication rights when it upheld a prison regulation that
allowed officials to refuse to deliver bulk packets of union literature to specific inmates
for distribution to others. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433
U.S. 119 (1977).
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impeded on their First Amendment rights. This was
highlighted when the issue of prisoners' mail rights came
before the Supreme Court again in 1987.
B. Turner v. Safley
One of the prison rules challenged in Turner involved a
ban on correspondence between prisoners within the Missouri
State penal system.9' The lower court declared that this rule
was unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4
decision.92 The Court found that the application of the Martinez
test would be erroneous in this situation where only the speech
rights of inmates were implicated. 3
The Turner decision reflects a step back towards the
"hands off"" approach. The Court noted that the judicial
branch of government lacked the "expertise" necessary to make
such decisions.95 In addition, the Court stated that using the
Martinez test in this instance would be problematic in that it
would "seriously hamper [prison officers'] ability to anticipate
security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the
intractable problems of prison administration."96 It would also
place courts as the rulers of prison operations, a role relegated
to the executive and legislative branches of government,
thereby having serious ramifications for the tenets regarding
separation of powers.97 Confronted with the Turner regulation
that solely implicated prisoners' free speech rights, the Court
once again backed away.
The Court created a four-part test, utilizing the rational
relation standard of review, to be implemented in situations
that solely involve prisoners' mail rights: (1) the prison
regulation must be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest; (2) the existence of alternative means of
91 Turner, 482 U.S. at 81. The ability to correspond with other prisoners
regarding legal issues was still allowed, as was correspondence that received staff
permission, but since these were such rarities, the rule operated as a practical ban. Id.
at 81-82.
MUSHLIN, supra note 9, at 218.
93 Turner, 482 U.S. at 87-88.
See Manetta, supra note 62, at 214.
Turner, 482 U.S. at 85.
Id. at 89.
97 MUSHLIN, supra note 9, at 218.
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exercising the right must be examined; (3) the burden that
accommodating the prisoner's rights places on the institution
should be taken into account; and (4) the lack of alternatives
available to prison administrators must be recognized.98 Based
on this test, the Court found the Missouri rule constitutional
since it was "reasonably related to legitimate security
interests."99
This decision emphasized the Court's stand that it will
defer to the abilities of prison officials to determine the policies
necessary to maintain institutional security when the free
speech rights of outsiders are not being threatened. The Turner
decision also seems to indicate that the Court is more
concerned with the First Amendment rights of outsiders than
those of inmates. The major difference between Martinez and
Turner is that in the former the rights of outsiders were
implicated, therefore imposing a far greater burden of proof
upon prison administrators to regulate inmates'
communication rights.' Only two years later, however, the
Court would offer new distinctions in the arena of prisoners'
mail rights.
C. Thornburgh v. Abbott
The claims in Thornburgh concerned the rules
established by the Federal Bureau of Prisons regarding the
censorship of incoming publications. The rule allowed the
warden to reject publications that, in his opinion, were
"detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the
institution, or . . . [that] might facilitate criminal activity."'
Prisoners could challenge the decision of the warden within the
prison system,'2 and the regulation had safeguards in place to
prevent the warden from censoring "a publication solely
because its content [was] religious, philosophical, political,
social, or sexual, or because its content [was] unpopular or
repugnant."' 3 The Federal Bureau of Prisons rule also allowed
"Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90 (citations omitted).
Id. at 91.
MUSHLIN, supra note 9, at 220.
101 Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 404 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b)).
' Id. at 406.
'03 Id. at 405 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b)).
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for complete censorship of a publication if any one of its parts
was found worthy of being banned.0 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, applying the Martinez test, found that the
rules failed the test and were therefore unconstitutional. 5 It
explained that the Martinez test was appropriate in this case
because outsiders, such as publishers and authors, were having
their free speech rights curtailed. 10 6 In a 6-3 decision, however,
the Supreme Court reversed, stating that the Turner test
governed this case, and that under that standard, the rules
passed constitutional muster.
0 7
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, offered two
reasons to explain why the Martinez decision did not apply.
First, Justice Blackmun stated that since Martinez, lower
courts had been applying strict scrutiny to free speech in the
prison context erroneously, given that such application does
not properly accord "sufficient sensitivity to the need for
discretion in meeting legitimate prison needs." 8 Second,
Justice Blackmun made a significant distinction between
incoming and outgoing mail. Martinez, he argued, must only be
used in situations where mail from prisoners to outsiders is
involved.0 9 His rationale was that incoming mail poses greater
threats to prison security than does outgoing mail, thereby
making it necessary to give prison officials greater latitude to
make decisions about incoming mail."0
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, accused the
Court of engaging in "a headlong rush to strip inmates of all
but a vestige of free communication with the world beyond the
prison gate.""' Justice Stevens argued that the Court had
changed the meaning of Martinez by confusing the distinction
between the free speech rights of outsiders and inmates with
the distinction between incoming and outgoing mail."2 This
"
1
' See 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b) (1988).
'5 Abbott v. Meese, 824 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
, Id. at 1170-71.
107 Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 404. The Court did remand though with respect to
the issue of whether the rules had been constitutionally applied. Id.
108 Id. at 410 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90).
109 See id. at 412.
"
0 Id. at 411-12.
1 Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 422.
112 Id. at 424.
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distinction made by Justice Stevens becomes particularly
important when discussing prisoners' rights to communicate
via the Internet.
To date, Thornburgh is the Court's final say on
prisoners' communication rights."' As such, there are currently
differing standards of review regarding mail that enters the
institution and that which exits the prison's gates. This rule of
law could prove to be problematic given the new legislation,
especially at the state level, that regulates prisoners' access to
the Internet. Whether or not inmates are allotted direct access
to the Internet via educational or work programs,"' many
prisoners gain access to electronic communication via regular
"snail mail.""' If a prisoner can currently write a letter and
send it out of the facility, and yet that same prisoner is
prohibited from accessing the Internet by writing a simple
letter, there is a conflict between existing inmate rights and
the legislation attempting to curtail them. The federal
legislation that has been passed so far has a good chance of
passing constitutional muster. In contrast, in states, such as
Arizona, where inmate Internet access is prohibited on
virtually all levels," 6 the implementation of such laws could
prove to be problematic given the existing discrepancy between
11 In 2001, the Supreme Court was once again confronted with issues of
prisoners' communication rights. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001). In Shaw,
Kevin Murphy was incarcerated at Montana State Prison. Id. at 255. While serving his
prison term, he was an "inmate law clerk," providing legal assistance to fellow inmates.
Id. After hearing that a prisoner he knew was being accused of assaulting a corrections
officer, Murphy wrote a letter to the inmate in question, advising him of what his
course of action should be and informing him that Murphy was more than willing to
help with the case. Id. Prison officials during the course of the regular screening
process intercepted the letter. Id. at 226. Murphy was disciplined for violating "rules
prohibiting insolence [and] interference with due process hearings." Shaw, 532 U.S. at
266. Murphy sued for injunctive and declaratory relief based on the theory that
prisoners have a First Amendment right to provide legal assistance to fellow inmates.
Id. Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, applied the standards enunciated in Turner
and found there to be "no such special right." Id. at 228.
... See infra Parts III and IV for further elaboration of these programs and
their implications.
The term "snail mail" refers to the regular postal service, which is slower
than e-mail. http'//www.whatis.conVWhatIs._Search_Results_Exact/1,282033,,00.html?-
query=snail+mail (last visited Nov. 20, 2000). For a discussion of this process, see infra
Parts III and IV.
"G See infra Part IV for an in depth discussion of the recent Arizona
legislation.
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the standard used for incoming mail and that which is used for
outgoing correspondence.
III. FEDERAL INITIATIVES
The Internet has raised numerous problems regarding
First Amendment rights. One such issue revolves around the
existence of pornography on the Web. The Internet gives people
who post information and pictures a worldwide audience, the
equivalent of which was not previously available by other
means. 117 Congress has taken various initiatives to regulate
content on the Internet," especially when such regulation aids
in the protection of children."9 Specifically, with respect to
prisoners and the Internet, Congress passed an amendment
entitled Stop the Trafficking of Child Pornography in Prison
Act of 1998 ("STOPP")" ° in an effort to curtail federal inmates'
access to the Internet. Despite the differing standards of
review, STOPP will likely be upheld because it was narrowly
written to protect a particular governmental interest. In fact,
looking to other Congressional acts regarding more general
Internet regulation that have been deemed unconstitutional,
STOPP's language makes concerted efforts to avoid First
Amendment problems. 1 '
On April 30, 1998, Representative Bill McCollum, (R-
Fla.), presented the Protection of Children From Sexual
Predators Act of 1998122 to protect the young citizens of
America from being lured by "Cyber-predators.""' Just days
"' See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., Telegraphs, Telephones, and Radiotelegraphs provisions, Pub.
L. No. 104-104, Title I, § 104, 110 Stat. 86 (1996) (amending 47 U.S.C.A. § 151).
19 See, e.g., Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub.
L. No. 106-229, Title IV, § 401, 114 Stat. 476 (2000).
12 H.R. 3729, 105' Cong. (1998) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 4042
(1998)) [hereinafter STOPPI.
1
21 See infra notes 126-75 and accompanying text.
1" Pub. L. No. 105-314 (H.R. 3494), 112 Stat. 2974-92 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter the Protection of Children From Sexual
Predators Act of 19981.
123 H.R. REP. No. 105-557, at 11 (1998); see also Child Protection & Sexual
Predator Punishment Act, 1998: Hearings on H.R. 3494 Before the Subcomm. on The
Child Protection and Sexual Predator Punishment Act, 105' Cong. 314 (1998) (opening
statement of Bill McCollum, Subcommittee Chairman) (transcript available at 1998
WL 11517121).
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before, on April 23, Congresswoman Deborah Pryce, (R-Ohio),
had introduced STOPP as an amendment to Congressman
McCollum's bill, prohibiting' any "agency, officer, or employee
of the United States... [from providing] any financial assistance
to[] any Federal program or Federal activity in which a Federal
prisoner is allowed access to any electronic communication
service or remote computing service without the supervision of
an official of the Federal Government."'
STOPP was drafted as a response to a 1996 case in
Minnesota involving inmate George Chamberlain."
Chamberlain, incarcerated with a twenty three-year sentence
for criminal sexual conduct, had earned admission into a
prison-based education and work program that allowed him to
work for Insight, Inc. while behind bars.' His access to the
Internet, which was required in order for him to do his job, was
unsupervised, and Chamberlain used the unfettered time to
download over 280 pictures of child pornography.' As a result,
he was found guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy
against the United States) and 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)
(possession of material involving sexual exploitation of minors
obtained by computers) and was sentenced to an additional
eighty-seven months. 9
Though STOPP may be considered an important piece
of legislation, especially in light of the above case, it does not
provide for much bite. The bill does not in any way hamper or
even mention inmate access to the Internet via third parties,
and in fact only impedes direct access to the extent that
Internet use must be properly supervised. The government
interest is clear-no repeat Chamberlain performances-and
the bill is sufficiently narrow to withstand constitutional
challenges based on vagueness or overbreadth. The language of
STOPP, and the bill of which it is a part, will save it from the
124 Esposito, supra note 13, at 52.
12
5 Id. at 52-53 (citing to § 801 of the Protection of Children From Sexual
Predators Act of 1998).
126 United States v. Chamberlain, 163 F.3d 499 (8th Cir. 1999).
127 Id. at 501.
128 Esposito, supra note 13, at 52-53.
'29 Chamberlain, 163 F.3d at 501. See also § 802(a)(1)-(5) of the Protection of
Children From Sexual Predators Act of 1998 (findings of Congress regarding the
Chamberlain case).
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fate that other pieces of legislation regarding Internet
regulation have met.
Congress has endeavored to regulate the Internet. Not
all of its attempts, however, have been successful. Most
notably, the Supreme Court decision that the Computer
Decency Act of 1996 is unconstitutional... alerted Congress that
its legislation would have to be written carefully. The
Computer Decency Act ("CDA") was passed as Title V of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.131 Though the main focus of
the law was to promote competition in the arena of
telecommunications, the CDA was directed at eradicating the
use of telecommunications as a medium to convey obscene and
harassing speech.1 32 Under 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a) and (d), a person
could be fined or imprisoned for up to two years for using a
telecommunications device or the Internet in order to transmit
anything that could be viewed by anyone under the age of
eighteen 13 3 that is either "obscene,"3 4 "indecent," 35 or "patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards."1 36 The day the CDA was signed by Congress,
numerous plaintiffs, led by the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU"), requested an injunction to keep the government
from enforcing the Internet-related provisions of the CDA. 
1 7
Among the plaintiffs were organizations that had posted
information online regarding prison rape, which, though it was
meant to be educational and informative, could be considered
"patently offensive" in certain communities. 8 The CDA
allowed both creators of the Web pages, as well as the Internet
service providers, to be held liable.139 In addition, violators of
the CDA did not need to know specifically that a minor would
130 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) [hereinafter Reno II].
131 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 47 U.S.C. (1996)).
132 See Communications Decency Act § 502 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996)).
For a helpful discussion of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Communications
Decency Act amendment, and the litigation that followed their passage by Congress,
see John McGuire, Comment, The Sword of Damocles is Not Narrow Tailoring: The
First Amendment's Victory in Reno v. ACLU, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 413 (1998).
13 See Communications Decency Act § 502 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996)).
134 Id. (amending 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1996)).
135 Id.
136 Id. (amending 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1996)).
"
7 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) [hereinafter Reno I].
138 See id. at 849 (Finding 123).
139 See McGuire, supra note 132, at 417.
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find the offensive site, but only that a mere possibility
existed.14 Finally, all Web page creators and Internet service
providers would be held hostage by the most conservative
community's views.1
The initial case challenging this legislation, ACLU v.
Reno12 ("Reno I"), was brought before the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. The court noted that the Internet is "a unique
and wholly new medium of worldwide human
communication." The district court examined the various
mechanisms the government suggested as tools to be
implemented within the context of the CDA. One such
mechanism, "tagging," would allow for certain sites with
offensive material to be "tagged" with codes that would alert a
minor's computer to filter out the site.'" The court determined,
however, that though the technology existed by which a site
could be coded, no filtration system yet existed.4 5 As such, the
court refused to uphold the constitutionality of a statute based
on the promise that the relevant technology would be
developed in the future.'46 The court dismissed the other
mechanisms suggested by the government as being
prohibitively costly to Web page creators and Internet service
providers.
47
The district court also evaluated existing software made
available to the private sector that allows parents to tailor the
Internet content to which their children are exposed.148 The
court concluded that these programs were not too costly to the
individual, and allowed parents to make individualized
decisions regarding Internet content---"a benefit not afforded
140 See id.
141 Reporter and writer for WCBS-AM in New York City, Lisa Fantino: "What
may be accepted behavior on the streets of Times Square will not necessarily sit well in
the Mormon communities of Utah .... The Communication Decency Act's attempt to
sanitize the Internet of indecency would homogenize the unprecedented information
exchange taking place in cyberspace." Symposium, The First Amendment and the
Media: The V-Chip & the Constitutionality of Television Ratings, Political Campaign
Spending Caps, & Restricting Speech on the Internet, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 303, 412 (1999) [hereinafter Symposium].142 Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 824.
.. Id. at 844 (Finding 81).
.. See id. at 847-48 (Findings 108-116).
See id. at 848 (Finding 114).
146 See id. at 857.
147 See Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 846-47.
141 See id. at 842 (Finding 69).
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by the CDA's blanket prohibition."149 The court did not,
however, base its final decision on the fact that there were less-
intrusive means available to protect the compelling state
interest involved.
The three judge panel based its decision on the fact that
the CDA was not only vague through its use of such terms as
"indecent,"150 but that it was not adequately tailored to meet
the interest of protecting children.'51 Judge Buckwalter argued
that since terms used in the CDA were not defined, there
would be no guidance for courts when asked to apply the
statute.'52 Judge Dalzell contended that the CDA was a
content-based regulation and as such would have to be held to
the strict scrutiny standard,"' which requires the pursuit of "a
compelling state interest through a narrowly tailored
regulation."'54 Judge Dalzell noted that compliance with the
CDA would be quite costly, leaving the Internet as a haven for
speech only to those who could afford it.'55 In contrast, Chief
Judge Sloviter argued that the CDA was too far-reaching in
that it censored from minors important information such as
Stop Prisoner Rape or the Critical Path AIDS Project, which
some could deem indecent.55 For these reasons, the district
court granted the injunction.'57 The government appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court' in Reno v. ACLU ("Reno II").'
In Reno II, the government argued that the protection
of America's youth was indeed a compelling interest and that
the CDA was written in a sufficiently narrow manner to
accommodate that interest. 60 Justice Stevens, writing for the
149 McGuire, supra note 132, at 421. "[Ilt can be argued that the framers
[of the Constitution] sought to firmly establish paternal protectionism by encouraging
the marketplace of ideas and leaving it to parents to present it to their children in
terms they see fit and at the appropriate time in their development." Symposium,
supra note 141, at 415.
'50 See Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 866.
' See id. at 864.
12 See id. at 865.
'5 See id. at 866.
'5 McGuire, supra note 132, at 421.
'' See Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 877-78.
16 See id. at 853.
157 See id. at 870.
155 The appeal went straight to the United States Supreme Court pursuant to
§ 561(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 561.
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
160 McGuire, supra note 132, at 423.
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majority, stated that the vagueness of the CDA's language
contributed to the overbreadth of the statute.'61 The Court
noted that "[e]ach medium of expression ... may present its
own problems."162
Justice Stevens analogized the use of the Internet to
that of the telephone rather than to other types of speech." He
stated that the Internet is quite unlike radio or television in
the sense that it does not have a history of government
regulation," nor does it have an "invasive" nature.'65 Rather,
the Internet is like the telephone in that users of the phone
must consciously dial numbers in order to seek out certain
services and messages.'66 Similarly, in order to find specific
content on the Internet, users must consciously look for it by
typing in particular addresses.' 67 The Court looked to its
decision in Sable Communications of California v. FCC" in
order to demonstrate the similarity between use of the
telephone and use of the Internet. In that case, a company that
offered pornographic messages to those who dialed the
appropriate number challenged an amendment to the
Communications Act of 1934,19 which "imposed a blanket
prohibition on indecent as well as obscene interstate
commercial telephone messages."'70 Like those susceptible to
liability under the CDA, the operators of the pornographic
telephone services in Sable were unable to determine who was
receiving the content of their messages.171 Since Internet usage
involves a conscious individual decision as to what content to
seek out, the Court found that the Internet should be regulated
in the same manner as telephone usage. Therefore, as with
Sable, where the Court struck down the amendment to the
" See Reno II, 521 U.S. at 871.
62 Id. at 868 (quoting S.E. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557
(1975)).
See id. at 870.
'See id. at 867.
"'See id. at 869.
"6 See McGuire, supra note 132, at 430.
17 see id.
"' 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
"9 See § 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934.
170 McGuire, supra note 132, at 429.
171 See id. at 429-30.
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Communications Act of 1934, the Supreme Court in 1997 found
the CDA to be unconstitutional.'72
Unlike the CDA, STOPP is neither vague nor overly
broad. In fact, STOPP does not really implicate prisoners' First
Amendment rights. Technically, it still allows for direct access
to the Internet for prisoners in work and educational programs
as long as it is properly monitored, which no more impedes
inmates' rights than the obstacles already inherent in
incarceration. In addition, STOPP makes no mention of
hampering inmates' Internet access via indirect means.
Therefore, as a result of its language, it is narrowly tailored to
protect the state interest involved. It follows that STOPP
should not face the same problems, if challenged, that the CDA
encountered. As such, its constitutionality, in all probability,
will be upheld.
Like the CDA, STOPP's purpose is the protection of
minors. It is interesting to note, however, that federal
initiatives regarding inmate use of the Internet were not
commenced until they could be shrouded in the compelling
state interest of protecting American youths. Presumably,
victims' families have tried to lobby Congress to pass
legislation regarding inmate access to the Internet given all
the outrage voiced in response to prisoner Web pages, personal
ads, and efforts to get sympathizers via the Internet.'73 In all
probability, however, the protection of children makes a better
argument as to why Congress is encroaching on First
Amendment rights74 than does the argument that legislation is
"n Id. at 430.
'7 Darlene Paris was stabbed to death along with three of her friends in 1990.
Janice Keson, the twenty-three-year-old victim's mother has "started a campaign to
pass legislation 'prohibitling] death row inmates from corresponding with anyone other
than their families and attorneys.'" Esposito, supra note 13, at 51. See also supra notes
38 and 42 and accompanying text.
'74 Courts as well as commentators have debated as to whether the protection
of children even qualifies as a compelling state interest, or whether the protection of
minors falls more properly under the responsibilities associated with being a parent.
See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (affirming that states have a
legitimate interest in the welfare of minors); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990)
(asserting that states have a compelling interest in protecting the physical and
psychological well-being of minors and in destroying the exploitation of children by
punishing those who possess and view child pornography); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972) (holding that the state has a right and a duty to protect minor children).
But see Alsager v. Dist. Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (holding that the
state's interest in protecting minors is not absolute, but rather must be balanced
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necessary because inmates on the Internet offend victims'
rights advocates' sensibilities.
STOPP also encourages states to take similar steps to
ensure stricter supervision of prisoner Internet access. 75 In
order to guarantee that such initiatives are taken at the state
level, STOPP requires the U.S. Attorney General to gauge the
degree to which "each State allows prisoners access to any
interactive computer service and whether such access is
supervised by a prison official."76 Every state has since
prohibited inmates from having direct access to the Internet,
but some states have responded with more far-reaching
initiatives that eradicate the possibility of indirect access as
well.'77 The recent initiative in Arizona, in particular, will not
be able to pass the test of constitutionality set out by the
Supreme Court. Similar to Arizona's law, Ohio's newest
initiative may face the same problems, but like STOPP, Ohio's
statute will probably be saved by its language.
IV. STATE INITIATIVES
Unlike the federal legislation discussed in Part III,
some states have started to take a far more aggressive
approach to inmate access to the Internet. Laws passed in
Arizona... and Ohio exhibit the lengths to which certain
legislators are willing to go to make sure that those who
"surf'79 the Internet will not encounter prisoner ads or Web
against the parents' interest in raising their children free from government
interference).
175 Esposito, supra note 13, at 53.
176 See § 803(a) of the Protection of Children From Sexual Predators Act of
1998 (mandating that the Attorney General take a survey within six months after the
effective date of the Act, and that a report be made to Congress outlining the results).77 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-235C (2000); OHiO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5145.31C(1) (West 2000). In addition, Kansas has made it illegal for prisoners to
contract with Web site designers, and New York has limited prisoner correspondence
to family and counsel in the hope that it will help to curtail inmate access to the
Internet. See Esposito, supra note 13, at 54.
178 For a comprehensive discussion of the passage of the law in Arizona, see
Karen J. Hartman, Comment, Prison Walls and Firewalls: H.B. 2376-Arizona Denies
Inmates Access to the Internet, 32 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1423 (2000).
179 To "surf' the Internet means to explore a series of web sites or to look for
something on the Internet in a random manner. http://www.whatis.com-
/WhatIsSearch_ResultsExact/1,282033,00.html?query=surf (last visited Nov. 20,
2000).
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sites.180 No state allows inmates unfettered direct access to the
Internet,18' but Arizona and Ohio have taken these limitations
one step further. Passing constitutional muster will prove to be
a near-impossible task for the restriction in Arizona 182 because
it is so broad in scope. Recent legislation in Ohio," however,
could be construed to be less restrictive. As such, it may have a
comparatively easier time surviving a constitutional challenge.
A. Arizona
Last year, while Jennifer Martinez was browsing the
Internet, she came across a web page featuring the murderer of
her father." Staring at Martinez was Beau Green's face, along
with a personal ad talking about his search for "fun women." "
Appalled at the sight of him, and outraged that he would have
access to such a luxury, Martinez and her mother began to
lobby for the passing of House Bill 2376, sponsored by then-
State Representative Jean McGrath.' They were successful. In
March 2000, Arizona passed amendments to completely
prohibit any inmate incarcerated within the state to gain
indirect access to the Internet 87 via written correspondence. 85
This statute makes it virtually impossible'89 for any Arizona
"'o See, e.g., supra note 33 and accompanying text.
18' See supra Part I.
182 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-235C.
'8' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5145.31C(1).
184 Quart, supra note 1.
185 Id.
186 Id.
1 Arizona has prohibited inmates from gaining direct access to the Internet
"through the use of a computer, computer system, network, communication service
provider or remote computing service" unless authorized by the department. ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 31-242A (2000).
1
" ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-235C reads:
An inmate shall not send mail to or receive mail from a communication
service provider or remote computing service. The department shall
impose appropriate sanctions, including reducing or denying earned
release credits, against an inmate if either of the following applies:
The inmate corresponds or attempts to correspond with a
communication service provider or remote computing service.
Any person accesses the provider's or service's internet Web site at the
inmate's request.
1'9 Presumably, it may still be possible for an Arizona inmate to contact a Web
design service by telephone since the statute specifically prohibits contact by written
correspondence and since phone calls are often not monitored. Nonetheless, this mode
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prisoner to gain access to the Internet. By specifically
prohibiting any contact by written correspondence between
inmates and a communication service provider or remote
computing service,19 ° without any procedural safeguards, the
Arizona state legislature has created a situation whereby
inmates will have salient constitutional claims.
The Arizona amendments affect incoming and outgoing
mail as well as inmates' and outsiders' First Amendment
rights, for which the Supreme Court has prescribed distinct
standards of review. 9' The burden on prison officials regarding
incoming mail is far easier to meet.192 Therefore, if a warden
argued that mail sent to inmates from Internet service
providers would threaten internal security,'93 then -he could
prove that the practice was "reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests," 4 and the method might well be declared
constitutional.
For outgoing mail, however, since the burden on the
state is far greater,'95 Arizona will have difficult obstacles to
overcome. Justice Blackmun held for the majority in
Thornburgh that outgoing mail does not pose threats to
internal prison harmony, and as such should be subjected to a
comparatively higher standard of constitutional review.9
Though the protection of society in general can be seen as a
compelling end, prison officials do not have the unfettered right
to keep inmates from gaining access to the Internet via
outgoing written correspondence. The suppression of
unpopular or distasteful content based on personal
determinations by prison officials cannot be the sole reason for
the censorship of letters leaving the institutional premises.
Arizona officials will be hard-pressed to provide legitimate
reasons that will pass the test of a mid-level standard of
of contact seems improbable because the way in which these services are contacted is
predominantly via email or regular correspondence.
:90 See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
191 See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 410.
'
9
2 See supra Part II.C.
'93 For example, a warden might argue that such mail would be disruptive to
the institutional environment because inmates may start to fight over who was
receiving such mail and who was not, or that it would disturb some sense of discipline.
This, of course, would have to be proven.
:94 Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 410.
95 See supra Part II.A.
19 Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 410.
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constitutional scrutiny. The fact that victims' rights advocates
are appalled by what they see on the Internet is not reason
enough to prohibit all access to prisoners if the tenets of the
First Amendment are to be upheld.
The Arizona statute is also problematic because it
prohibits outsiders from contacting a "provider's or service's
Internet [Wieb site at the inmate's request."19 7 This amendment
to the Arizona statute not only acts as a practical impediment
to the public's First Amendment rights, but the offense also
seems hard to prove. There is no mention of inmates' rights in
this clause, only those of outsiders. As such, it is highly
doubtful that such a rule would gain the Supreme Court's
approval since the freedom of expression rights of those in the
free world are held to a heightened level of scrutiny.'98 Though
the legislature may argue that it is infringing on these rights
to spare the general population from having to confront what
some would consider highly offensive or disturbing material on
the Internet, this is not a "compelling state interest"'"
recognized by the Court.
In addition, it is hard to foresee how prison officials
would be able to monitor whether anyone in the outside world
had accessed an Internet service provider's Web site at the
request of the inmate or whether they endeavored to do so by
personal choice. Apart from the instances where prison
administrators find particular requests in outgoing mail, other
scenarios are entirely possible. It is conceivable, for example,
that a concerned friend, family member, or prisoners' rights
advocate could choose to contact such a service to disseminate
information, obtained either in regular correspondence from
the inmate or through telephone calls, without the specific
request of the prisoner. Even Martinez, the private individual
who pushed for this law to be passed, recognizes the limits on
enforcement and the law's efficacy:
"
1 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-242A.
'8 See KNIGHT & EARLY, supra note 15, at 215.
1'9 In Herceg v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), a
mother sued the magazine because her son hanged himself after reading an article in
Hustler about autoerotic asphyxia. Though some may have found the contents of the
article offensive, the court held that since the article did not incite the minor to
perform the act that led to his death, the speech was entitled to First Amendment
protection. Id. at 1020.
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We have to allow [inmates] to get mail, and we can't prevent them
from contacting parties outside of prison .... Prisoners online is an
issue ahead of its time: we can take away prisoners' good time
credits for using third-party Web access, but how will prisons know
that Arizona prisoners are posting online unless they pay a
correction staffer to go to all of these websites all the time?
The new law in Arizona also allows for the reading of all
outgoing mail of any prisoner who violates this section by
corresponding with a service or provider or by requesting that
someone do it for him."1 Stephen Bright of the Southern Center
for Human Rights in Atlanta believes that the recent Arizona
law is "unconstitutional and impractical-'ike trying to tell
Niagara Falls not to flow.' 202 Eleanor Eisenberg, executive
director of the ACLU in Arizona, has stated that her
organization is considering filing suit against the Arizona
initiative.0 3 The ACLU states that laws like the one passed in
Arizona hamper "an inmate's First Amendment right to
communicate . .. [and] also chill] the rights of third parties
who have committed no crimes."2 °"
An examination of the Arizona law raises new questions
regarding inmates' communication rights, which will have to
be explored further as time passes. It is understandable that
there is an important link between incoming mail and prison
security, thereby necessitating a lower level of scrutiny in
deference to the expertise of prison officials. However, the
Supreme Court's recognition that outgoing mail and
institutional harmony are more tenuously related should be
honored by state legislatures when drafting bills concerning
inmates' communication rights. In addition, legislators should
also note that the Court has been unwilling to compromise the
free speech rights of those not incarcerated. To access the
Internet via third parties, the prisoner would have to mail
20D Quart, supra note 1. Jennifer Martinez did in fact accomplish her
immediate goal: Beau Greene's website has since been removed from the Internet. Id.201 ARIZ. REv. STAT § 31-235(c).
202 Locke I, supra note 21.
203 Internet Gives Prisoners Link to Outside World, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2000,
available at http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/w08OlOOa.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2001).
As of April 1, 2002, the ACLU has yet to file suit.
214 Id. "In one case, Eisenberg said, prison officials censored the mail of an
attorney who had sent his client legal documents that he had downloaded from the
Web." Id.
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regular correspondence to a designated friend, family member,
or Web site designer. Whatever the prisoner wished to have
posted on the Internet could not logically be a threat to prison
security (the government interest involved), even though it
may be viewed as unsavory or offensive to the public at large.
In order for material posted on the net to have an adverse
effect on the tranquility of a prison or penitentiary, the
undesirable content would have to be downloaded, printed, and
mailed to the inmate. Upon its arrival at the institution,
however, it would be considered incoming mail and would thus
be subjected to a lower level of scrutiny, thereby allowing
censorship if necessary."5
Though it is entirely understandable that relatives of
victims are horrified by the fact that the perpetrator who
harmed their loved one is posting romantic want ads on the
Internet, this cannot overshadow the importance of upholding
the values associated with freedom of speech. To do so would
permit this nation to be held hostage by any voice disapproving
of certain modes of expression. Such a scenario was presented
by the adoption of the CDA, which would have allowed for the
most conservative community to dictate content on the
Internet."6 The First Amendment was created to allow for a
free exchange of ideas, regardless of the content. Laws, such as
the one passed in Arizona, are incompatible with this purpose
and do not establish a salient tie as to how they provide for the
protection of the government interest involved (prison
security).
Should litigation concerning Arizona's statute reach the
Supreme Court, the Justices will have to reevaluate their
stance on prisoners' mail rights if they wish to uphold this
recent legislation. Since inmate access to the Internet is
secured via outgoing written correspondence, and since it
implicates the First Amendment rights of outsiders, the
Supreme Court could reasonably implement the intermediate
scrutiny test developed in Martinez."°7 Arizona legislators and
prison officials would find this challenge insurmountable since
there is no argument connecting outgoing Internet access with
internal prison security. The government could contend that
205 See supra Part II.C.
206 See supra Part III.
207 Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413. See also supra Part II.A.
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Internet access could cause problems among the prison
population if riots were started because some inmates were
gaining access while others were not. This argument, however,
proves to be inherently flawed since access is attained via
written correspondence-a right that is granted to all inmates,
save perhaps during periods of solitary confinement.
Therefore, if the Supreme Court wished to uphold the
constitutionality of Arizona's amendment, it would have to
reconsider the Martinez test,29 and make the level of scrutiny
that of rational relationship, as discussed in Thornburgh.210
This seems highly unlikely, however, in this particular case
since the Arizona statute places sanctions on the rights of
members of the free world to exercise their freedom of speech.
Ultimately, Arizona could assert that content on the
Internet coming into the institution could easily pose a threat
to the compelling state interest of maintaining prison security.
The Court would undoubtedly agree with such an assertion,
and would find that in those cases the burden placed on prison
officials to prove that censorship was warranted would be far
lower than that posed by intermediate scrutiny. The Court,
however, even despite recognition of this argument, would still
strike down the Arizona law since it is far-reaching in its scope
by making currently legal behavior illegal. Interestingly, Ohio's
new initiative regarding inmate access to the Internet may
contain some of the same flaws associated with Arizona's
recent legislation. The language used by the Ohio legislators,
however, may save that bill from the same fate that Arizona's
statute is destined to meet.
B. Ohio
As of November 1, 2000, prisoners in the state of Ohio
are no longer able to gain access to the Internet even via
indirect means. n The Ohio law, however, is not nearly as
208 See KNIGHT & EARLY, supra note 15, at 218.209 Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413. See also supra Part II.A.
211 Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 404 (1989). See also supra Part II.C.
211 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5145.31C(1) reads:
No prisoner in a correctional institution under the control or
supervision of the department of rehabilitation and correction shall
access the Internet through the use of a computer, computer network,
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extreme in scope as that which was passed in Arizona. As such,
it is less likely to fail a constitutional challenge.
By denying prisoners access to the Internet via
computer, telecommunication, or information services,212 the
Ohio law will face many of the same obstacles as the recent
statute in Arizona. Even if the initial step taken by the
prisoner is simply to write a letter, an act not proscribed by the
Ohio statute, ultimate access to the Internet would still be
dependent on someone's use of a computer and service provider
on behalf of the inmate, and as such, the statute could be read
to have as broad a ban as the law recently passed in Arizona. It
follows that this section of the new Ohio legislation will come
into conflict with the current varying standards of review for
incoming versus outgoing mail. As suits are filed, it will be
interesting to see what arguments the Ohio prison officials will
make as to the penological interest that this law protects.
Ohio legislators, however, were arguably more careful
in drafting their statute than those in Arizona. Ohio still
allows Internet access if the inmate is participating in an
approved educational program.213 This allows at least a door for
prisoners to gain access to the Internet in certain cases; the
institutional administrators may be able to argue that
excluding everything except educational programs meets a
legitimate penological interest. The Arizona law, in contrast,
does not provide any procedural safeguards, but rather is a
blanket ban, making it harder to pass constitutional muster. It
seems that Ohio may be able to have its law upheld due to its
language, yet only if it is narrowly read to prohibit access
attained through the direct use of a computer,
telecommunication, or information service. If, however, Ohio
legislators intended for the new law to be a blanket
prohibition, including access to the Internet attained through
computer system, computer services, telecommunications service, or
information service unless both of the following apply:
(a) The prisoner is participating in an approved educational program
with direct supervision that requires the use of the Internet for
training or research purposes.
(b) The provision of and access to the Internet is in accordance with
rules promulgated by the department of rehabilitation and correction
pursuant to section 5120.62 of the Revised Code.
Id.
212 Id.
213 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5145.31C(1)(a).
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the initial step of written correspondence, then the Ohio
legislation will be subjected to the same fate of
unconstitutionality as the Arizona statute. Should the Ohio
statute be held constitutional by virtue of narrow construction,
this would not be a significant blow to prisoners' First
Amendment rights since inmates presumably would still be
able to access the Internet via indirect means.
If the true purpose of Ohio's law is to eradicate the
presence of inmates on the Internet, the statute will be quite
inadequate. If the law is narrowly defined, then sympathetic
outsiders may maintain pages by writing on behalf of prisoners
using information obtained by written correspondence, phone
calls, or visits. Prisoners would even be able to write directly to
Web site designers and service providers if Ohio's initiative is
interpreted to forbid inmate access to the Internet only by
direct use of a computer. If the law is interpreted broadly,
however, to include even indirect access to the Internet via
written correspondence, and the Court maintains the existing
standards of review, then the Ohio bill will be just as
ineffective since the Court will strike it down in its entirety as
unconstitutional. As such, legislators must truly think about
the end they wish to achieve and be careful to recognize
whether these ends are, in fact, constitutional.
Government representatives should also note not only
the immediate and direct effect of their legislation, but the
long-term and indirect consequences as well. It would be
interesting to find out whether legislators would reconsider
their efforts if they realized the serious ramifications that
could follow for freedom of speech rights in general if the rights
of inmates to communicate were continuously pared down. In
addition, there is a threat to society posed by not allowing
prisoners contact with the outside world since many of them
will eventually be released. Both prison officials and legislators
could argue, however, that Internet access is not necessary to
maintain outside ties given that before the Internet's
popularity or even its invention, rehabilitative endeavors
within the prison system already existed. While this is true,
one must be realistic and recognize that as technology
progresses, it is in society's best interest that all of its members
adapt to the changing conditions. While inmates should not be
allowed direct access to the Internet, further restrictions on
20021
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their ability to write to outsiders will undoubtedly lead to the
possibility of further regulations on outsiders' ability to
communicate.
V. CALIFORNIA: THE CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION
The first case to challenge an inmate's Internet rights
came before a California court in February 2001. In re Aaron
Collins214 involved a prisoner incarcerated at Pelican Bay State
Prison. Mr. Collins challenged a policy that prohibited any
materials downloaded from the Internet to enter the facility.
Collins argued that the regulation was unconstitutional under
the First Amendment. The First District Court of Appeals for
the First Division of California upheld the prison policy as
rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. The
appellate court failed to recognize the practical problems that
its decision creates.
In mid-1997, Mr. Collins subscribed to INMATE
Classified, a company that for a fee creates and maintains
prisoners' Web pages on the Internet.215 Like many other such
services, each prisoner Web page has an email address."6
Periodically, INMATE Classified will print up a prisoner's
emails and mail them to him or her via the postal service.217
Aaron Collins received several such packages of emails while
incarcerated at Pelican Bay until May 1998, when the warden
issued a memorandum stating that the institution would no
longer accept such mail.21 In fact, the new policy banned all
materials downloaded from the Internet from entering the
prison gates, as well as any otherwise acceptable mail that
included such downloaded material.219 Mr. Collins filed a
petition for habeas corpus challenging the regulation on First
Amendment grounds.22 °
214 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
215 Id. at 110.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id. The warden cited California Code of Regulations, title 15, § 3138(f)(1) as
authority, claiming that material downloaded from the Internet fell under the category
of unauthorized publications.
219 Collins, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110.
220 Id.
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At the hearing on the petition, the trial court conducted
an in-depth factual investigation into the factors the warden
cited as dispositive proof of the need for such a regulation,
namely the potential for an unduly burdensome workload on
the institutional staff and prison security. Among those to
testify at the hearing on behalf of Pelican Bay were the
warden, the supervisor of the prison mailroom, and a detective
acting in the capacity of an expert in Internet law enforcement
and investigation.2' Both the warden and the mailroom
supervisor went into great detail explaining the volume of mail
received each day by the prison, noting that each piece of mail
was subject to a high level of scrutiny and physical inspection
before determining whether the addressee inmate will actually
receive the letter or package.2 Given the "quick and easy
accessibility of communication by email," prison authorities
were concerned that the volume of mail received by inmates
would increase exponentially, causing an excessive strain on
institutional resources.' To allow prisoners to receive printed
copies of all their emails, which could easily contain junk mail,
would lead to an "exorbitant workload."2
In addition, the warden argued that due to the nature of
Pelican Bay, namely as an institution housing many gang-
related inmates who have attempted to use the mail for illegal
purposes both inside and outside the prison, the allowance of
Internet-generated material would allow the prisoners an easy
avenue via which to propagate their illegal activities.' The
detective stated that email causes particular security risks
given its inherent nature: it is easier for a sender to disguise
his or her identity on an email than it would be on more
traditional forms of mail.22 6 This danger, however, was placed
in perspective by a computer consultant who testified at the
court's request. While he acknowledged that it could be more
' Id. at 110-11.
'
2 Id. at 111. Approximately two to five thousand pieces of mail are opened at
Pelican Bay each day between Monday and Friday. Each piece of mail is checked to
make sure there is no inmate-to-inmate communication, as well as to ensure prison
security by looking for contraband, illegal plans, etc. In addition to such traditional
screening, another ten percent of the mail is randomly subjected to closer scrutiny.
3 Id.
" Collins, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111.
5 Id.
22n Id.
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difficult to trace the source of a particular email, most people
are unaware of the steps necessary to hide their identities. 7
The consultant did admit that it was possible to send an
unlimited amount of information via email, but that it was not
true that email automatically lent itself to allowing for coded
messages. Rather, "that would depend on the sender's
ingenuity rather than the medium." 8 Based on the testimony
in the aggregate, the trial court ultimately held that inmates
could continue to receive Internet-generated material subject
to certain restrictions, most importantly that it be deemed non-
confidential and scrutinized accordingly. 9  The warden
appealed."0
While noting the first impression nature of this case,
the First District Court of Appeals for the First Division of
California nevertheless cited to the principles in Turner as
guidance."' Placing much emphasis on the tradition of
deference given to institutional authorities with respect to
matters concerning prison rules, the court found that the policy
banning information received from the Internet was rationally
related to a legitimate penological interest. 2
The appellate court implemented the four-part Turner
test,23 citing Thornburgh as authority that the same principles
apply regardless of whether the First Amendment rights of
prisoners are involved. 4 Recognizing that security concerns
are always a legitimate penological interest, 5 the court looked
to the remaining pertinent factors. The policy was considered
by the court to be neutral in that it banned all Internet-
generated material regardless of content. 6 Furthermore, the
court found the warden's concerns based on the nature of email
to be rational. 7 Judge Strankman, writing for the court,
227 Id.
228 id.
29 Collins, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111.3 Id. at 112.
2311d.
232 Id. at 115.
"' See infra Part II.B.
234 Collins, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 113.
" Id. at 114.
236 Id.
237 Id. The, court conceded, however, that had Collins presented evidence to
refute that conclusion, the outcome would very well have been different. Id. (citing
Frost v. Symington, 197 F.3d 348 (9th Cir. 1999)).
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pointed out that Pelican Bay need not prove that email or any
other material downloaded from the Internet actually caused a
breach in security, but rather only that the connection between
the two is a rational fear based on the facts."'
As to whether there were any less restrictive means
available to achieve the same end, the court found that the
policy adopted by Pelican Bay State Prison hardly impededinmates' rights. Judge Strankman reasoned that each
prisoner's Web page on INMATE Classified included a postal
address in addition to an email address."9 As such, inmates
could continue to keep such Web pages, but would have to
simply receive and send mail via more traditional means.24 0
The warden pointed out that this would have very little impact
on prisoners' communication rights since there are no limits
imposed on how many letters an inmate may send or receive so
long as such letters meet the existing requirements."4
Finally, the court found that the burden on the
institution was too great."4 Evidence was presented to exhibit
the already significant backlog in the Pelican Bay mailroom."4
In addition, the mailroom was already understaffed by six
people, and the warden argued that the potential increase in
mail due to Internet-generated material could force the
screening measures to be compromised or at the very least
ensure that inmates would receive their mail late.244 All of
these facts combined convinced the appellate court that the
regulation imposed was rational given the prison's security
concerns and the probability of an undue burden on the
institution. Mr. Collins, in the court's opinion, failed to present
any evidence to rebut the prison's arguments: "Collins has not
demonstrated that there are obvious, easy alternatives to the
policy that would accommodate the rights at issue at de
minimis cost to the prison's legitimate security concerns." 5
'8z Collins, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115.
239 Id.
240 id.
241 id.
242 id.
243 Collins, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115.
244 Id.
245 Id.
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The decision in Collins is surprising because it fails to
take into account the practical problems associated with
enforcing such a regulation. The logical extension of the
reasoning used by the appellate court is that an inmate could
receive an article from the New York Times, barring any other
restrictions, so long as it was physically cut out of the
newspaper and not downloaded from the Internet. The same is
true with any other information that can be obtained from
multiple sources. To say that security concerns are foremost in
this case would misstate the true issue.
If the problem is that it is far easier to hide one's
identity through the use of email, then perhaps there would be
a rational basis for the regulation, but the ease with which
people can do so is highly questionable. If the issue is that
large documents can be attached to emails helping to hide
contraband or escape plans the same way that large
publications are able to do, then the prison should limit the
number of pages that a piece of mail can include. To simply
ban all material from a particular source without any concern
for content simply does not make much sense.
The only things that truly distinguish Internet-
generated material from any other letter or piece of
information that is typed instead of handwritten, are graphics,
URL address and time/date print at the bottom of the page,
and perhaps the actual layout of the information. All these
things, however, can be easily changed or deleted in order to
make an email or any other material downloaded from the
Internet look like any other typewritten letter, which barring
restricted content, would be allowed through the prison's gates.
Safeguards already exist: any piece of mail that enters the
institution is already subjected to such a high level of scrutiny,
and prison authorities can censor any individual piece of mail
if it is questionable. Even when the Supreme Court allowed the
ban of all hardcover books from prisons, it still permitted such
material to enter the institution so long as it was sent from the
publisher. No such allowances are made here, however, when
all Internet-generated material is banned.
Collins is another case that exhibits the movement of
courts back to the highly deferential position taken with
respect to prison matters. Courts will seldom second-guess the
decisions of institutional authorities when it comes to internal
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prison rules and regulations.26 However, in Collins the real
issue is who would bear the cost of any potential increase in
prison mail. The true result is that inmates have their
constitutional rights curtailed because of money, not safety,
concerns.
Finally, if Collins only considered whether Mr. Collins
would be able to receive email from his INMATE Classified
Web page, then the case would be different. The Web page does
in fact have a postal address where he could be reached.
However, the regulation at Pelican Bay bans all information
from the Internet. Some material can only be accessed via the
Internet, material that if it were not for its source would not be
restricted from the prison environment. As such, the regulation
upheld by the California appellate court is overinclusive, by
restricting activities and information that would otherwise be
allowed.
CONCLUSION
As people continue to innovate and technology
progresses, society must adapt to the changing conditions. So
too, must the courts. The drafters of the Constitution could not
possibly have foreseen the advent of such inventions as the
Internet or its pervasiveness. Nor could they possibly predict
which rights enumerated within the Constitution would be
implicated by these developments. As such, it is the duty of all
three branches of the government to consider the Constitution
as a living organism that grows with society. This is not to say,
of course, that the interpretation of the Constitution must alter
each time we are confronted with new technology. Rather, the
legislature and the judiciary must reevaluate and make
changes, when needed, to existing laws when rights are
implicated. This is no easy task, however, when the rights
involved are those of a prisoner's ability to communicate.
One of the most exalted aspects of this nation is that it
is based on freedom of expression. The free exchange of ideas,
whether faultfinding or praising, popular or unpopular, is
246 The Seventh Circuit in Rogers v. Morris, No. 01-3903, slip op. at 2 (7th Cir.
Mar. 20, 2002), has since cited Collins as authority to uphold a regulation in a
Wisconsin prison prohibiting material downloaded from the Internet.
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critical for a progressive society to exist. One's ability to
express one's thoughts is based on the premise that the next
person can do the same. The notions of free will and choice also
have close connections to the First Amendment in that silence
and non-choice are forms of expression as well. The fact that
something horrifies someone does not mean that someone else
did not have the right to say it, but rather that anyone has the
right to tune out or turn away. This is not to say that all forms
of speech are allowable or should be remedied by simple
avoidance, but that only a small class of expression falls into
this category."'
Granted, when one breaks the law and is thereafter
incarcerated, the most elementary purposes are to punish and
to deprive one of societal luxuries.248 For many, though,
incarceration is temporary and so rehabilitative factors should,
to some extent, be considered. A prisoner's ability to maintain
contact with the outside world should be as important to the
public as it is to the individual in that the inmate will one day
reenter society. The crux of inmate access to the Internet,
however, revolves around the issues of the nature of the
technology involved and the First Amendment. rights
implicated, rather than around the problem of rehabilitation.
This is true in that even before the invention of the Internet,
rehabilitative programs and initiatives existed within the
prison environment.
The Internet allows both inmates and outsiders access
to a far larger audience than was ever available before.
Granted, in the past, a prisoner's personal ad had a much
smaller chance of passing a victim's family's path due to the
confines of regular mail. Yet the reason we praise the Internet
for being the instrument that connects all voices of the world
should not be the reason that we denounce it if some of those
voices are those of inmates. Evenif Internet technology acts as
247 Speech that incites violence or other criminal behavior is one example. See,
e.g., Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (maintaining
that the First Amendment does not protect speech that causes damage to reputation
from libel or defamation); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (stating that speech
that is deemed obscene is not protected by the First Amendment); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that free speech protection does shelter advocacy of
force, but does not protect speech that incites or produces imminent lawless action or is
likely to do so).
218 See generally Esposito, supra note 13, at 60-64.
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a microphone for prisoners, it does so also for people who
advocate racism, sexism, and other patently offensive
messages. The Internet allows for the free exchange of ideas in
a manner that has never existed before. In some senses, it has
provided the ultimate stage upon which free speech rights can
be exercised. This is not to say that prisoners should have
completely unfettered access to the Internet. It is only to say
that there should be no blanket prohibition of inmate Internet
access.
The Supreme Court will have some important decisions
to make regarding inmate communication rights given the
influx of legislation and the possible litigation challenging each
bill's constitutionality. If the Court wishes to uphold the
constitutionality of this legislation, it will undoubtedly have to
reevaluate the current standards of review surrounding
prisoners' First Amendment rights, and when these standards
should be applied.
As it stands now, while direct inmate Internet access is
basically obsolete, 9 prisoners are still gaining access to the
Web via written correspondence and the help of third parties.
Such indirect access has proven to be quite controversial. The
fact that the manner in which inmates gain indirect access to
the Internet involves the already established right of sending
outgoing mail and the free speech rights of those not
incarcerated, suggests that any legislation regulating such
access would be subject to the intermediate level of scrutiny by
the Supreme Court.
The argument "that outgoing mail should be closely
regulated for the purposes of public safety and that any beliefs
that outgoing mail is not harmful should be discouraged"" ° is
problematic in that it hampers inmates' rights to freedom of
expression in a way that courts have been unwilling to
uphold. 5' This is not to say, however, that proponents of such a
view do not have a notable point, but rather that should the
Supreme Court reconsider its stance on the differing standards
of review for incoming and outgoing mail in light of new
litigation, the reason will be the pervasive use of the Internet
249 One exception is educational programs in designated prisons.
2' Manetta, supra note 62, at 210.
25 ' See Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). See also supra Part II.A.
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in society and the problems that such use now poses, not
because of larger notions of general public safety.
Prohibition of direct Internet access for inmates is
understandable given the Chamberlain situation and the fact
that access to the Web remains a luxury to a certain extent.
Prisoners should not have laptops in their cellblocks or be
granted entrance into chat rooms while incarcerated, but
blanket prohibitions of inmate Internet access via indirect
means would open the flood gates, allowing for various types of
speech to be censored even outside the prison arena. It follows
that no matter how offensive an inmate's presence on the
Internet may be, the alternative would threaten one of the
most fundamental and exalted principles of this nation-the
freedom of speech.
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